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Governing Suburbia: Modalities and Mechanisms of Suburban Governance

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EKERS M., HAMEL P. and KEIL R. Governing suburbia: modalities and mechanisms of suburban governance, Regional Studies. This paper traces the major modalities of suburban governance through a review of the extant literature on the matter. Based on the existing debate on suburban governance it appears that three modalities can be differentiated: the state, capital accumulation and private authoritarianism. A case is made for each and how they function and interrelate is developed. What are the \textit{universal} and \textit{particular} forces shaping suburbanization processes in different urban-regions? It is also argued that governance itself needs to be used in critical sense by extending its meaning towards issues of suburbanism, not just the process merely of suburbanization.

Suburbanization Suburbanism Governance Global suburbs

EKERS M., HAMEL P. and KEIL R. Gérer la banlieue: modalités et mécanismes de la gouvernance suburbaine, Regional Studies. Cet article passe en revue les principales modalités de la gouvernance suburbaine à partir d’une recension des écrits sur la question. À la lumière du débat en cours relatif à la gouvernance suburbaine, trois mécanismes de gestion peuvent être distingués, à savoir: l’État, l’accumulation de capital et l’autoritarisme privé. Chacun est présenté sous l’angle de son mode de fonctionnement et des relations qu’il entretient aux autres. Quelles sont les forces universelles et particulières qui structurent les processus de développement suburbain dans diverses régions urbaines? Les auteurs soutiennent aussi que la gouvernance elle-même doit être considérée sous un angle critique en élargissant sa signification par rapport aux enjeux de la réalité suburbaine et non simplement en référence au processus d’un développement suburbain.

Développement de la banlieue Vie périurbaine Gouvernance La banlieue à l’échelle mondiale

INTRODUCTION

A large literature explicitly investigates how urban-regions are governed. Researchers have studied how immigration policies, housing, infrastructure, transportation and development processes contribute to how urban-regions are governed and experienced. Whether it is urban regime theory, growth coalitions, regulation theory or accounts of urban social movements, there are many conceptual resources for understanding how urban-regions are planned, built and struggled over. However, much less attention has been paid to the question of suburban governance; specifically, the constellation of public and private processes, actors, and institutions that determine and shape the planning, design, politics, and economics of suburban spaces and everyday behaviour. Admittedly, a range of different scholars and (sub)urban commentators have explored the regulation of suburban spaces and processes of suburbanization. Yet, often the discussions are not couched in the language of governance per se (for exceptions, see Phelps et al., 2010; and Phelps and Wood, 2011). At the same time, any survey of the existing literature would reveal that it is exceedingly difficult to pin down exactly what suburban governance means and how it is practised. The reason for this is the explosion of terms utilized to describe suburban forms of urban decentralization ranging from boomburbs (Lang and LeFurgy, 2007a, 2007b), peri-urban development (Dupont, 2007; Hirt, 2007), exopolis (Soja, 1989), edge cities (Garreau, 1991), slum and squatter settlements (Davis, 2006), post-suburbia (Teaford, 1996; Phelps et al., 2010), gated-communities (Low, 2004, 2008), and the in-between city (Sieverts, 2003; Young et al., 2011). The array of descriptors makes the task of ascertaining similar and different modes of suburban governance difficult yet still a necessary project. This is the project taken up in this paper.

In 2009, Michael Neuman and Angela Hull organized an enlightening special issue in this journal entitled ‘The Futures of the City Region’. Neuman and Hull opened by commenting on the dizzying number of neologisms developed by urban-regional scholars:

Like in the Greek myth of Pandora, the plethora of urban spatial descriptions is almost a curse on those who attempt comprehensive understanding. (Neuman and Hull, 2009, p. 777)

Their answer to this problem appears to be a call for conceptual modesty. Speaking of conceptual approaches to cities and urbanization, Newman and Hull suggest that the range of theories on offer tend to ignore those parts of reality that the theoretical construct and conveying image cannot capture, and thereby gloss over the complexity of the contemporary city region. (p. 780)

While it is wise not to use theory in a manner that suffocates the particularities of history and geography, the present paper charts a different course from Newman and Hull and aims to develop a framework, and argument, that accounts for the universalization of suburbanization, while maintaining a focus on the particular manifestations of this global process.

Different descriptors of suburban life signify particular forms of decentralized urban space. Yet behind all of these forms of suburbs are the processes of urbanization and suburbanization, or what Lefebvre (1968, 1970/2003) described as the ‘urban revolution’. At the time of writing, Lefebvre’s revolution was just a hypothesis, but now the process of urban decentralization is being witnessed globally. Powerful processes of uneven development, capital accumulation, migration and agricultural transformations have resulted in varied forms of peri-urban development that touch all urban-regional spaces. However, the universalism of this process should not occlude the particularities of how suburbs are produced and lived. Both the form and the content of different suburban spaces are heavily path dependent, reflecting different political, economic, cultural and environmental histories. Moreover, the social and ecological histories affecting the permutations of suburbanization and forms
of everyday life are marked by relations of power, inequality and marginalization, which profoundly affect the trajectories of suburban growth and decline.

Suburbanization is now a global process (Harris, 2010; Keil, 2011). Governance involves accounting for the particular manifestations of this more general urban-regional process. The governance of suburbanization and attendant forms of everyday life is a matter of identifying the constitutive dynamics shaping and influencing how suburbs are produced and experienced. Governance contains a politics of suburbanization that facilitates its process but also questions the effects of growth (and decline). This may include a politics in which suburbs and centres appear to be openly at odds as demonstrated in the recent mayoral election in Toronto (for an early journalistic assessment, see Keenan, 2010; for the politics of suburbanization in Toronto more generally, see Keil et al., 2011; for the Frankfurt case, see, for example, Keil and Ronneberger, 1994). Suburban governance can be part of a more general politics of scale but can also entail a number of social and economic dynamics in which politics may be present but invisible. The question then asked in this paper is as follows: What are the universal and particular forces shaping suburbanization processes in different urban-regions?

Given that suburbanization continues to accelerate in urban-regions around the globe, it is necessary to explicate the processes through which an increasingly suburban world is constituted in different forms and spaces (Harris, 2010). Is it possible to delineate a specifically suburban mode of governance? What are the different modes of governance that facilitate development processes? What are the specific techniques, policies, practices, ideologies and representations through which the governance of suburban spaces is achieved? The governance of suburbanization touches on issues of redistribution, sustainability as well as inclusiveness and segregation, all of which are pressing political problems. It is the explicit political character of suburbanization that pushes for a consideration of the governance of suburbanization and its profoundly unequal geographies, environments and social histories.

The discussion is organized as follows. First the paper attends to some definitional issues and explains what is meant by the terms ‘suburbanization’ and ‘governance’. It then tries to discuss the landscapes of (sub)urban theory and interrogate the problematic political presumptions associated with periodizing suburban developments. It is suggested that it is more effective to understand the history of suburbanization through the lenses of self-built, state-led and private-led development. Subsequently, attention is turned to three different modalities of suburban governance focusing on the role of the state, capital and emergent forms of authoritarian governance. Throughout this discussion focus is made on the specific mechanisms through which the governance of suburbanization is achieved focusing on different policies, practices, ideologies, coercive actions and the role of aesthetics. The authors try to ground and explicate the arguments by providing examples from a variety of spatial and historical contexts.

SETTING THE TERMS: SUBURBANIZATION, SUBURBANISM AND GOVERNANCE

Suburbanization

In light of the dizzying number of different descriptors that are deployed to identify forms of peripheral urban development, there is a surprising degree of universalism to this process given that the expansion of urban space is a global phenomenon. Yet, the universal character of suburbanization is, to date, largely unrecognized. Often referred to as an ‘urban revolution’ (Lefebvre, 1970/2003), most urban growth worldwide now takes the form of peripheral or suburban development. Urban planners and environmentalists oppose low-density sprawl for its disproportional environmental impact and find the ‘explosion’ of squatter settlements problematic. Despite normative preferences in official planning and city building discourse for a dense and centralized urban form, and despite growing evidence that the kind of growth that has been experienced in past decades is ‘ perverse’ (Blais, 2010), suburbanization remains the dominant mode in which cities are built (Filion, 2010). Whether by choice or by force, builders and inhabitants, rich and poor, construct and live in urban peripheries around the world. The process of constructing residential enclaves, squatter settlements, commercial developments, business and industrial parks, and fragmented infrastructure on the peripheries of urban-regions collectively represent the varied processes of suburbanization (Harris and Lewis, 2001; Saunders, 2010).

Suburbanization is defined as the combination of non-central population and economic growth with urban spatial expansion. Although suburbanization is not uniformly applicable to all parts of the world, this generic term is carefully deployed here to incorporate all manner of peripheral growth: from the wealthy gated communities of Southern California, to the high rise-dominated old suburbs of Europe and Canada, the faux Westernized outskirts of Indian and Chinese cities, and the slums and squatter settlements in Africa and Latin America. The key point then is that suburbanization is always differentiated and assumes many hybrid forms.

Suburbanism

It is also possible to detect a growing prevalence of qualitatively distinct ‘suburban ways of life’, which is referred to as suburbanism(s). Unique land-use patterns of suburbs, relative to the central city (although there are hybrid forms of mixed patterns; Stevverts, 2003), engender differing social and cultural norms of suburban life. Among the causes of such variation and dynamics is
density as it relates to transportation (reliance on the automobile in some places, alternative forms of transportation—walking, cycling, jitneys—elsewhere) and socioeconomic distinctions. The distinctions between central city and suburbs go in different directions according to the continent and, in some cases, the metropolitan region. While there is often less density in suburbs, this is by no means the case everywhere. Further, density is not only just a feature in edge cities, but also in European banlieues, Asian new towns and Canadian suburbs. For instance, there are important socioeconomic distinctions between suburbs and the central city that may construct diametrically opposed value systems affecting democracy, justice and sustainability (Sewell, 2009; Cowen, 2005).

**Governance**

Over the last twenty years the term ‘governance’ has become central to political, policy and academic debates. The term is slippery and difficult to define as policy actors, scholars, corporations, and politicians all project different meanings and political agendas onto the term. For enthusiasts, such as some policy-oriented individuals, non-governmental organizations and corporations, governance represents the possibility of renewed cooperation and consensus between a range of different private and public actors. Normative treatments of the term focus on how a particular civic, environmental or private problem or issue can be resolved through engaging different stakeholders in a process of consensus building and problem solving (for a discussion, see Jessop, 1998; and Swyngedouw, 2005). Organizations such as the United Nations (UN), among many others, have latched onto governance, and also the practice of governance, as a way to confront urban issues. In this vein UN-Habitat defines urban governance as

> the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken. It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens.

(as quoted by Dupont, 2007)

While this definition is nuanced, and as will be shown it reflects a more critical literature on the question, it remains normative, focusing on ‘good governance’ and in particular the conditions necessary for such practices of governance. Thus, both Erik Swyngedouw (Swyngedouw, 2005, 2009) and Gordon McLeod (McLeod, 2011) are right to question the political efficacy of ‘governance’ given its neoliberal and ‘post-political’ character.

In more critical hands, governance represents a heuristic device angled towards understanding how different processes and issues are negotiated, regulated and struggled over. There is a focus in this more critical tradition on how and why different social and environmental outcomes are achieved, and moreover, their ecological and social implications. The concept of governance is appealing insofar as it tries to gather together and identify the varying institutions, practices, discourses, ideologies and representations that affect how different spaces and processes are produced, contested and experienced. This definition is expansive, yet the appeal of the term is precisely in its integral broad character. For instance, understanding different processes of suburbanization requires grasping the discourses of homeownership, the aesthetics of architecture, the dynamics of capital accumulation, political processes of annexation and incorporation, representations of central cities, and many more relations. Treated broadly, governance helps these varied relations to be appreciated.

To be more specific, the overarching question of governance is viewed as a process involving state, market and civil society, which implies democratic deliberation and social conflict (Hamel, 2008) while being social, spatial and political. Firms, markets, and the state are complementary and contested arenas of governance with fluid boundaries (Harris, 2003). Contestation through official politics or through the social and economic stratagems of everyday life is also relevant especially in liberal societies (Blomley, 2003; Foucault, 2003; Leitner et al., 2007; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Purcell, 2008). Here, effective de-democratization exists along stated goals of democratic governance (Swyngedouw, 2005). It is assumed, therefore, that the concept of governance exceeds normative definitions centred on ‘good governance’. It entails recognizing that authoritarian forms of rule are associated with suburban expansion through state action and market discipline.

Planning, politics and policy are central to governance. Contemporary states claim to manage suburban growth ostensibly for public ends or to avoid disadvantaging minorities. From a critical perspective, the capacity of states effectively to realize social and environmental objectives can certainly be called into question, yet the yardsticks for success within municipal governments and the development community are significantly different from our own. When made by private-sector agencies, the scope of governance is usually limited to specific areas/subdivisions or aspects of development. In the case of municipal governments or state agencies, the scope may extend over wide regions and multiple growth processes, such as Ontario’s recent greenbelt that regulates both natural and built spaces (McDonald and Keil, 2012). Depending on the character of government agencies, and the pressures to which they are subject, the results may be more or less equitable.

The spatiality and scalar character of governance processes are increasingly in flux. As Beauregard (2006) explained, historically

> the dominance of the center … was replaced by a fragmentation of the periphery brought about by suburban
development. Urbanization had jumped to the metropolitan scale.

For example, classical urban renewal schemes may displace large numbers of urban dwellers from downtowns; or modernization programmes of developmental states such as Turkey may drive former gecekondu dwellers (squatters on public land) from their homes, resettling them in high-rise apartment buildings (NEUWITH, 2005). Any attempt to comprehend suburbanization must pay attention to the varied agents, methods institutions and scalar processes through which development is managed. Together, these may be viewed as the mechanisms of suburban governance.

Suburban governance

In broad terms there are two central aspects of suburban governance, the first of which concerns how processes of suburbanization and forms of suburbanism are differentiated historically and geographically. Yet at the same time, in an increasingly globalized urban world, suburbanization processes in different spaces are guided by similar practices whether it is, for example, annexation (COX, 2010; KENNEDY, 2007; ZHANG and WU, 2006) or the diffusion of ideologies that sanctify decentralization, public choice and private homeownership (LANGLEY, 2009; MARCUSE, 2009). Thus, the second aspect of suburban governance entails accounting for the points of convergence regarding how suburbanization proceeds whether in Eastern Europe, the United States, South Asia and in a range of other spaces. Suburban governance thus is about accounting for both the converging and diverging patterns of peripheral development. Doing so requires paying attention to the varied agents, methods, relations and institutions through which development is managed. Together, these can be viewed as the mechanisms of suburban governance.

As LANG and KNOX (2009) suggested several years ago in this journal, processes of suburbanization are now subsumed into emerging megalopolis spaces. While they argued (following BECK et al., 2003) that ‘suburbs’ are a ‘zombie category’ at odds with the contemporary form of urban-regions, they also suggested that outer suburban and exurban spaces continue to expand rapidly and define the growth of ‘edgeless cities’. Thus, it is possible to identify suburbs as one ‘moment’ of development and life within growing megalopolis regions. One then has to keep in mind that mechanisms of suburban governance are also increasingly taking place at the scale and within the space of city regions. In fact, the problems of political regulation that public authorities are facing are more and more inscribed within metropolitan areas where specific issues (socio-spatial segregation, security, environment, health, education, matters of sustainable development) are being discussed (JOUVE, 2005). Metropolises are not only the main location where it is possible to observe the restructuring of relations between state and civil society, but also the main sphere directly affected by social changes related to neoliberalism (JOUVE, 2005). Thus, from a political economy perspective, the new territorial frames associated with metropolises are becoming the spaces where a new capitalist regulation is implemented and where capitalist contradictions are transferred to, but also the scale where new compromises have to be worked out (BARAIZE and NÉGRIER, 2001).

An important gap remains, however, between metropolitan institutions on the one hand and functional territories on the other (LEFÈVRE, 1998). As PHELPS et al. (2010) suggested, suburbia had been, and postsuburbia continues to be, constructed within a thin institutional setting with communities being incorporated and acquiring formal government structures some time after their initial development, straddling existing government jurisdictions, and eventually being woven in a more complex set of intergovernmental relations at the urban regional scale.

While the endurance of institutional fragmentation is perhaps underplayed in these remarks, Phelps et al. elucidated one of the central tensions of governing suburbanization and post-suburbanization, which is the misalignment between political institutions and the rapid growth of decentralized development, which continually transforms the territoriality of urban-regions (BOUDREAU et al., 2006, 2007; LE GALES, 2003; PHELPS and WOOD, 2011).

LANDSCAPES AND HISTORIES OF THEORY

Ananya Roy has suggested that accounts of ‘global’ urban-regions have been heavily influenced by the European–American experience, while other ‘worldly’ spaces have been neglected (ROY, 2009). The issue for Roy is that European–American accounts of urbanization have become hegemonic and are projected onto other spaces as if the experiences of cities such New York, London and Paris are the universal against which other cities are examined. Roy argues that this false-universalism makes it difficult to understand the multiple metropolitan realities throughout the Global South, which are central to global-urban networks and represent the spaces in which urban theory must be generated. Roy’s critique is incisive and persuasive and goes to the heart of analyses of suburbanization, even though she rarely speaks of suburbs. Often it is assumed that the US experience represents the paradigmatic case of suburbanization that other cases are measured against. Suburban spaces such as Levittown, New York, are often held up as idealized
versions of suburbanization. However, one of the key points of agreement in the blossoming literature on suburbs is that diversity is the norm rather than the exception, which means that Levittown is but one form of suburbanization. This is even more evident when one considers the range of suburban development occurring in post-socialist states (Hirt, 2007; Hirt and Petrovic, 2011), China (Feng et al., 2008; Zhang and Wu, 2006), India (Dupont, 2007; Kennedy, 2007), Africa (Davis, 2006; Grant, 2005), and even within Europe and North America, where denser or non-conforming forms of suburbanization are seen (Fishman, 1987; Freund, 2007; Young, 2006). In terms of the governance of suburbanization, Roy pushes us to consider multiple worldly forms of governance, not as derivative of the US experience, but rather as central to the increasing suburbanization of urban-regions in all spaces including the United States. Much more, suburban architectural forms classically associated with English and American suburbs, such as the bungalow, villa and veranda, all have their roots in places such as India and the Mediterranean and were appropriated through colonial processes (King, 2004, pp. 97–110). In their own ways, both Roy and King illustrate the necessity of going beyond the North American and European suburban experience and push us to consider different worldly forms of suburbanization.

At the same time, periodizing suburbanization processes risks falling into the Euro-Americanism that Roy warns against. There is the danger of taking one central case as the benchmark and measuring other experiences against it. Implicitly, measuring other cases against this periodization renders these spaces and histories derivative to the primary history. A recent article by Feng et al. (2008) illustrates this issue. They suggest that the differences [between China and the United States are related to the different stages of suburbanization rather than being caused by the dichotomy of market and planned economies.

(p. 84)

The authors go on to suggest that China’s market-led development and suburban diversity lags behind the emergence of these trends in the United States, which first occurred in the 1980s and are now occurring in China. Similarly, definitions of ‘post-suburbia’ seem to rely on American residential suburbs from the Fordist era as the comparative basis for defining of post-suburbia as diverse residential, commercial and technical spaces (Teaford, 1996; Phelps et al., 2010; Phelps and Wood, 2011). Phelps et al. (2010) are certainly aware of this issue and are careful to signal how even Fordist suburbs were more differentiated than is often assumed, which perhaps speaks to the limits of using the US residential experience as a central point of comparison.

If periodization is risky, how else can the history of suburbanization in different spaces be assessed? Surveying the literature, it is possible to detect different styles of suburbanization that likely, but do not definitely, occur on the urban periphery. The three styles of development identified are self-built, state-led and private-led suburbanization. These three forms of suburban development do not unfold in a teleological manner from one stage to another, but rather each type of suburban expansion is evident in different historical moments and spaces. Even a cursory look at the US experience illustrates so much, with self-built and private enclave development defining the nineteenth century (Fishman, 1987; Hayden, 2003) and then in the middle of the twentieth century the active role of the state was witnessed (Harris, 2004; Hayden, 2003; Jackson, 1985), and currently the resurgence of private development is seen, the most dramatic form of which is the gated community (Atkinson and Bandy, 2005; Low, 2004, 2008). In other spaces such as former socialist states, the state was the prime actor in producing dense suburban housing (Young, 2006), and after the collapse of Soviet-style rule, self-built fragmentary homes emerged on the periphery of urban centres (Hirt, 2007; NuiSSI and Rink, 2005). In India, after tight state control, a mixture of unplanned informal housing developments emerged followed by more recent private-led development in the form of business and commercial parks as well as affluent residential suburbs (Dupont, 2007; Kennedy, 2007). The different experiences defy periodization yet illustrate a changing articulation of state, private and self-led development patterns.

Self-led peri-urban growth is serendipitous and occurs without detailed planning. The scale of development ranges from individual, residential and commercial developments to large tracts of informal housing. This type of development is thus fragmented and heterogeneous and is typified by low regulation. Infrastructure tends to be poorly developed and characterized by the type of disconnectivity that Graham and Marvin (2001) described as ‘splintered urbanism’. In contrast, state-led suburbanization is centralized, planned and directed by government agencies. This style of suburbanization is dependent on conscious establishment of residential, industrial and commercial developments, often through deliberate zoning and planning processes. Infrastructure connectivity tends to be utilized as a lever for guiding and regulating the development process. Market- and private-led development tends to involve decentralized control, yet the state plays a facilitative role in terms of land use, labour and environmental policy, and judicial and legislative frameworks. This type of suburbanization takes commercial, residential and industrial forms, although it is defined by political and social exclusion. Development is exclusively for profit and tends to be uneven as new spaces boom while others decline. These three different forms of suburbanization represent ‘ideal types’ that nonetheless represent concrete forms and processes of suburban
development – albeit affected by particularities of history and geography. In contrast to periodizing suburban expansion and decline, distinguishing between self-led, state-led, and market- or private-led development, avoids taking the Euro-American case as fundamental and highlights divergent yet comparable processes in different spaces.

THE GOVERNANCE OF SUBURBANIZATION

In a thought-provoking piece, Phelps et al. (2010) sought to identify key political contradictions that animate post-suburban settlements, including the tension between pursuing growth and provisions for collective consumption, the contradiction between the expansion of settlements and the conservation of environmental and residential amenities, and the contradictory forces favouring either amalgamation or secession. While Phelps et al. nicely highlight the thorny political issues at the heart of different forms of decentralized growth and life, this section takes a slightly different tact, identifying three different modalities of suburban governance. The word ‘modality’ is used in order to denote the manner and mechanism through which the governance of suburban spaces and environments proceeds. Thus, the focus is more on the broad relational processes and institutions that come to bear on the thorny political problems identified by Phelps et al. that constitute the governance of suburbanization and suburbanism. The discussion considers the state, capital and forms of authoritarian action as the modalities of suburban governance. In using the term ‘modality’ the relationality of different social, political, economic and environmental processes is also signalled. Thus, while capital plays a constitutive role in shaping suburban development and life, its governing function can be channelled through the state or non-democratic forms such as homeowners’ associations. Likewise, the foreclosure of suburban mortgages, which re-concentrates wealth in the hands of banks, is not possible without the power of the state and specifically the judiciary. Thus, while three modes of suburban governance are identified, it is important to appreciate how they ‘work through one another’.

The state

In an excellent review of the literature on urban politics, MacLeod and Jones (2011) suggested that a ‘localist ontology’ has perhaps blinded scholars to the role of the national state in the politicization of urban spaces. However, the emphasis on localism has perhaps also shielded from view the ways in which scaled states have been a key conduit for suburbanization in a variety of different historical and geographical cases. This point is so commonsensical that it is worth remembering that peripheral urban development has occurred in the absence of state action. In Canada, prior to the Second World War, residential decentralization was not centrally planned by different tiers of the state but rather was more reflective of individual initiative as families tried to secure low-cost housing on the fringe of urban centres such as Montreal, Vancouver and Toronto (Harris, 2004). In nineteenth-century England, peripheral development was largely a private pursuit that occurred along major arteries. The development process was chaotic and land-use policy and planning on behalf of the state did not dictate the suburbanization process (Hayden, 2003). The state has also played a minimal role in the emergence of informal housing developments on the fringes of metropolitan regions in the Global South (Kennedy, 2007). As Davis (2006) suggested, in the Global South the idea of an interventionist state strongly committed to social housing and job development seems either a hallucination or a bad joke, because governments long ago abdicated any serious effort to combat slums and redress urban marginality.

While the state has not always played a key role in the growth of suburbs, it is possible to identify transition points in which the state emerged as a key actor in the governance of the suburbanization process.

Sonia Hirt identified three forms of states and suburbanization processes that affect the contours of suburban expansion (Hirt, 2007). First is the developing capitalist state, which Hirst argued takes a passive role, largely because of lack of resources. In this situation, migrants tend to settle on the periphery of urban centres in self-built housing. The second form is the developed capitalist state, in which, as already discussed, the state is active in promoting urban decentralization through planning, financial and infrastructural policies. The third form is the socialist state, which reacted to low death rates and high birth rates and urban migration by building high-density housing on the edges of urban centres. In all of these different cases ‘governance’, as the broad regulation of social life, is hardly separated from ‘government’ proper.

In Europe, and especially in France, the role of the state in the suburbanization process was partly similar and partly different from what occurred in North America. The emergence of industrial suburbs in the twentieth century – which happened at the same time as an urban demographic explosion – occurred between the two World Wars with the construction of poor-quality individual cottages for the working-class population. After the Second World War, at first, the centrality of historic central city cores was not challenged by urban sprawl and suburbanization as was the case on the other side of the Atlantic. But that does not mean that sprawl did not occur and suburbs did not expand. The lack of housing led the Western
European governments to opt for building huge, mostly spatially peripheral, complexes of affordable apartments (called grands ensembles in France) that increased the density of those suburbs. However, until the 1970s the preferred location choice of the majority of households remained largely the central city. By the 1970s, public policies were reoriented towards the development of individual houses with the consequence of encouraging urban sprawl (Boyer, 2000). If at the outset, the grands ensembles were thought as a symbol of modernity with a positive image attached to them, it was not long before that representation was transformed into its opposite (Foucault, 2000). In fact the reality is much more complex. The social changes at play in these banlieus reflect a profound transformation of social relationships (Dubet, 1995).

In North America the state became actively involved in suburbanization in the post-war years. Historically in this context, the state can be said to govern the suburbanization process in two key respects. First is through the financing for home ownership and various government programs and tax incentives. In Canada, the establishment of the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) was a state policy aimed directly at providing housing for veterans, but it was quickly expanded to bolster suburban homeownership more generally (Harris, 2003). The Canadian state’s securitization of long-term mortgages facilitated the demand necessary for the emergence of Fordist suburbs such as Don Mills in Toronto. In the United States, the Federal Housing Administration was developed in 1938 in order to securitize mortgages and thus increase the ability of the middle class to attain home ownership. In the post-war era, the GI Act provided veterans with relatively low-cost loans in order to facilitate their entry into the middle class. The emergence of the classic post-war suburb – replete with single-family homes, car parks, laws, cul-de-sac, segregated residential communities – was boosted by state involvement in the financing of homeownership (Hayden, 2003; Jackson, 1985). As Hanlon et al. (2010) suggested,

through its various tax, fiscal, and housing policies, the federal government [took] away the risk of mortgage lending and [made] house purchases an attractive proposition for households.

(p. 167)

State policies geared towards suburban boosterism were not directed at the social body as a whole but rather had a particular class, racial and gendered character. In a careful study of housing policy in the United States, George Lipsitz argued that the Federal Housing Act of 1934 had the effect of channelling ‘almost all of the loan money toward white communities and away from communities of colour’ (Lipsitz, 1995, p. 732). This channelling of loans had a distinct spatial form as money was withheld from older inner-city neighbourhoods and directed to ‘white’ segregated suburban spaces. At the same time, state involvement in the housing market was also heavily class-based. As Hanlon et al. (2010) argued, tax policies in the United States are such that mortgage interest payments are tax deductible and since 1951 taxpayers can sell their houses without paying capital gains tax. As these authors argued, these policies ‘are amongst the most regressive subsidies, aiding wealthy and middle-income households more than lower-income households’ (p. 168). As is widely noted, part of the governance of post-war North American suburbanism entailed regulating gender relations and enshrining heteronormativity as a guiding principle of suburban life. Loans were clearly premised on relocating families to suburban spaces and the ideologies – rather than strict reality – of male breadwinners and domestically focused women went hand in hand with the extension of long-term mortgages to the middle class (Domosh and Seager, 2001). This short discussion of the classed, raced and gendered character of state policies illustrates how the governance of the suburbanization process is never politically neutral insofar as the interests of specific social groups are furthered while the fortunes of others are limited.

The second manner in which the state has governed the suburbanization process is through the development of infrastructure and the promotion of mobility as a central value of modernity (Ascher, 1995). The North American case is fairly well known and was typified in the post-war era with massive investments in highway and parkway development, which was part of a broader Fordist accumulation strategy (Gandy, 2003). In the Canadian case, suburbanization was facilitated by regional planning policies in which targeted municipal infrastructure guided the development process. The state played a key role in the planning and zoning of suburban development historically focusing on segregating residential areas from commercial or light-industrial zones. While planners may have hesitations about low-density sprawling developments, suburban councils continue to rely on development fees as a lucrative source of revenues (Lorinc, 2006). The state’s land-use and transportation decisions have never been made without responding to the interests of private capital (Fowler and Layton, 2002). The point then is that the state can act as a conduit for the interests of private capital, which demonstrates a modal relationship between supposedly ‘private’ and ‘public’ actors.

Infrastructure-led suburban development has also been occurring at a ferocious pace in cities in South East and East Asia. In the case of Hyderabad, India, Lorrain Kennedy argued that infrastructure development has driven recent peri-urban development (Kennedy, 2007). While the provincial state has not necessarily directly financed and built infrastructure, it has spurred on development through a series of incentive schemes such as lax zoning and labour regulations and a series of rebates on registration fees, energy and
the cost of land. In return for these incentives, private actors are required to produce high-technology infrastructure, including satellite connections, fibre optics, security, parking, etc. These policies have resulted in the development of information technology parks such as Hyderabad Information Technology Engineering Consultancy City. The governance of this project is decidedly state led and clearly scaled focusing on the urban-region as the key to economic success in a globalized world. In fact, Kennedy builds on the work of Brenner (1999, 2004a) and others to suggest that peri-urban development is one case of reterritorialization that has occurred in the wake of more globalized economic processes and the rescaling of the national state in India.

While globalized political economic process have bolstered the role of urban-regions in numerous cities across the world (Brenner, 1999, 2004b; Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Hudson, 2007; Keil, 2000; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Sassen, 2001; Scott, 2000), state-led suburban development has occurred historically in non-capitalist and emerging-capitalist states. Hirt (2007) discussed how socialist states aimed at settling provincial-to-urban migrants in high-rise districts around historic urban cores. Housing was not the product of elite consumer choices and the desire of many to ‘escape’ the city, but rather was driven by state policy. In the case of China, and in particular Beijing, prior to 1990 suburbanization was similarly guided by state action (Feng et al., 2008). Prior to land and housing reforms that occurred in the 1990s, city rehabilitation schemes were achieved through industrial relocation and the development of satellite towns on the urban periphery. Thus, in different geographical and historical contexts, and with different state forms, governments have played a crucial role in peripheral development in urban-regions.

The state’s involvement in suburbanization is also differentiated by scale and objectives. In a familiar narrative, the demise of nationally led state ‘command-and-control’ centres has resulted in the emergence of urban-regions as the prime space of social, cultural, political and economic life. Kevin Cox argued it is ‘important to place local governments in the context of the state as a differentiated territorial form’ (Cox, 2010, p. 215). The restructuring and decentralization of the state has resulted in the emergence of a range of other actors such as non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, welfare associations, grassroots organizations and the private sector, all of which play a more significant role in governing suburban affairs (Dupont, 2007; Low, 2008; Shaw, 2005). In this respect, the restructuring of the state has resulted in a blossoming of the forms of governance that guide development processes. At the same time the governance of suburban life by different ‘scales’ of the state is differentiated and is often a point of conflict. The response to the exotic and predatory mortgages in the United States is one example of this. Immergluck (2009) explained that several states in the United States developed bills to regulate high-risk loans which illustrates how the state is internally differentiated and scaled.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that the state is a site of contestations and the institutional and political target of different social groups that critique false and narrow notions of ‘citizenship’ (Gauchet, 1998). Governance necessarily goes hand in hand with an active citizenship and with the possibility of governing differently (Leresche, 2001). The territorial differentiation that is reinforced by governance raises important questions about the principles beneath the reality of a unitary state as observed in the French republican state (Jouve, 2003). This said, the state remains an actor and a dimension that cannot be ignored in the ongoing restructurings processes. What the authors have in mind here is the necessity to insist on the role the state is playing as ‘an actor and institution’ in the process of governance. Even though governance always implies a profound questioning about the supremacy of the state through an opening towards civil society, this does not mean that political conflicts have disappeared. And their redefinitions always imply a central reference to the state not only as a mediator, but also as a central institution. In that respect, governance does not proclaim the end of the state. It is a way to highlight from a different angle the emerging models of social and economic regulation in the making.

*Capital accumulation as a governing force*

At a normative level, governance is generally discussed in terms of different actors that enter into processes of negotiation and dialogue regarding a discreet problem. More often than not, the large forces that shape the direction of discussion and eventual course of events are occluded. Decisions around the allocation of resources, housing density, infrastructure and zoning are not made in a political economic vacuum as if processes such as capital accumulation did not exist. Early research on suburbanization, the work of Logan and Molotch (1987) being one example, was quick to highlight the role of capital accumulation in affecting the geographical and social make-up of development on the urban periphery. The influence of the development industry on the suburban landscape and the politics of development are central to understanding the role of capital in suburbanization processes (MacDermid, 2009). By now, the centrality of the development industry is well understood and has led to a large body of literature that examines the formation and effect of development regimes, growth machines and growth coalitions especially in the context of suburbanization and metropolitanization (for example, Beaurregard, 2006; Fainstein, 1994; Frug, 1999; Jonas and Wilson, 1999; Knox, 2008; Lauria, 1997; Stone
and Sanders, 1987). A powerful critique of liberal accounts, Logan and Molotch’s (1987) seminal work suggests that the ‘market’ and ‘consumer choice’ are central drivers of suburbanization. They argued that markets themselves are the result of cultures; markets are bound up with human interests in wealth, power, and affection. Markets work through such interests and the institutions that are derived from and sustain them. These human forces organize how markets will work, what prices will be, as well as the behavioural response to prices. (p. 9)

Highlighted here is the social character of the market, and specifically the social forces and institutions that constitute the market in the first instance and define its social implications in the last instance. The key human force that is discussed in this section is capital. Capital drives (sub)urban spatial forms in the pursuit of the expanded reproduction of capital. Cox (2010, p. 217) suggested that ‘central to an understanding of the question of urban governance is the accumulation process’. Cox argued that capital, and the social interests it represents, is distinct from the market in that the former is granted a determining role rather than the assumed passivity of the market, which supposedly benignly allocates resources and decisions. The constitutive effects of capital are tied to dynamics of ‘overaccumulation, investment in the built environment, drag on fluidity and potential devalorization’ (p. 217). Cox builds on David Harvey’s pioneering work on the spatial dynamics of capital accumulation (Harvey, 1982, 1985, 1989). The threat of devaluation or the prospects of accelerated accumulation affect how urban-regions are governed and determine the coalition of forces that come together in an effort to realize increased profits and/or displace devalorization onto competing jurisdictions. The question of governance for Cox (2010, p. 200) is precisely about ‘turning capital’s inconstant geography to local advantage’. The forces of capital and the state work through one another insofar as the state can secure the interest of capital in the last instance whether through lowering regulations or providing financial support, as has been seen in the recent subprime mortgage crisis and the economic downturn more broadly.

One of the clearest examples of the governing role of capital in the suburban process is the relocation of industrial and technological firms to the suburban periphery of urban-regions. The economic crisis of the 1970s and demise of Fordism fundamentally accelerated suburbanization processes. Although existing infrastructure in citycores proved to be a heavy drag on the fluidity of capital, industrial and commercial expansion grew rapidly on the peripheries of urban centres. As Soja (2000) noted, in the last third of the 20th century the regional balance of industrialization in many postmetropolitan areas was reversed, with the majority of production and jobs located in the outer rings than in the inner cities of regions. (p. 242)

Suburbanization became a staple of a neoliberal, ‘vulgar’ regime of capital accumulation which ultimately contributed to the financial crisis that has held the world in its grip since 2008 (Harvey, 2012; Knox, 2008; Peck, 2011). What has driven this process? Or in other words, what does capital have to do with it? Capital always has an uneven geography, at different scales (the urban, regional, national and global), and certain regions experience rampant growth while others stagnate and decline (Massey, 1984; Hudson, 2007; Smith, 1984).

Companies always look for competitive advantage and seek to capitalize on spatial differences in an effort to increase the rate of accumulation. For instance, land rent and prices on suburban peripheries are substantially lower than in city cores. In addition, the cost of development on greenfield sites is drastically lower than redeveloping brownfield sites that continue to exist in the core of urban-regions and in the inner suburbs. Industrial development on the periphery also decreases what Harvey (1982) described as the turn-over time of capital as the movement of parts and products from suppliers and distributors avoids the transportation snarl of city cores. At the same time, industrial and commercial transportation networks increasingly link suburban spaces rather than city centres. Jurisdictional fragmentation within urban-regions often means that lower property and corporate taxes can be utilized to draw companies out of the city centre.

Early in the twentieth century, industrial suburbanization was a key feature of Canadian and American urban-regions. Similar to the more recent currents of decentralization, lower rents, captive labour markets, and transportation networks spurred the relocation and development of factories and worker housing on the urban periphery (Gad, 2004; Lewis, 2000). The unevenness of capital accumulation played a key role as manufacturers sought competitive advantage. The influence of capital on the suburban landscape was closely tied to the state, which provided tax and infrastructure incentives. Fragmented and shifting political boundaries meant that local boosterism was a key part of attracting growing industries. These dynamics continue to be witnessed. The rise of economic activity on the suburban fringe has been the hallmark of post-Fordism. The vertical disintegration of companies, the rise of just-in-time production, lax labour regulations, and the attack on organized labour have produced new configurations of space and agglomerations of suburban economic activity (Amin, 1994; Harvey, 1989; Scott, 2000). This increasingly includes the financial capital and service industries that maintain a symbolic presence in the core, yet decentralize back-office functions to the periphery as a cost-cutting mechanism. The growth of industry on the periphery that is occurring on the outskirts of Chinese cities has defined the technology boom in Indian cities and has been an important
One of central political economic shifts of the last forty years has been the rise of financial capital, which has been an unwieldy force in most urban-regions (Sassen, 2001), although it should not be forgotten that the finance class has been pivotal to urban-regions even before the emergence of capitalism (Rodríguez and Feagin, 2006). Looking at the foreclosure signs that litter suburban landscapes in the United States, it would be difficult not to afford finance capital a governing if ultimately also destructive role in the shaping of suburban life (Marcuse, 2009). Immergluck (2009) described the limited role of government as a form of passive regulation, or in present terms ‘passive governance’. The rise of financial capital brought with it the deregulation of mortgage markets in the 1980s, which Immergluck argued facilitated the securitization of property and loans. In the 1990s the lending industry was ‘disintegrated’ and there was a decline in ‘originate-to-hold’ lenders and increased bundling and trading of loans as if they were a financial asset disconnected from the use-value of the house, a trend that Harvey (1982) anticipated when he argued that housing was increasingly a fictitious commodity disconnected from its use-value. Immergluck (2009) argued that as financialization happened federal policy makers did little to adapt supervisory systems to the new market structure constituting a form of ‘passive’ deregulation.

Paradoxically, the governance of subprime mortgages occurred through the absence of state action. The rhythms of capital accumulation, over-accumulation and crisis tendencies have significantly impacted the dramatic events witnessed over the last several years. At a macro-level, capital experienced a significant downturn in the 1970s, and many have argued it has not recovered since as is witnessed in the repeated speculative bubbles and crisis that have beset economies all over the world (Brenner, 2002; Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2007). What is the significance of this broad analysis of capital for one’s understanding of suburbanization and suburbanism? The speculation in the housing market created a massive speculative bubble, which, when it burst, was destined to create turmoil. As early as 2000, Robert Brenner signalled how the dot.com crash facilitated a massive flood of financial capital into the real-estate market (Brenner, 2002). Historically low interest rates and rapid increases in housing prices created a ‘wealth effect’, which from the vantage point of 2002 was merely an effect rather than the generation of substantive value. The refinancing and flipping of homes spurred on economies from the late 1990s through to the subprime mortgage crisis. The lurching of investors from one asset class to another facilitated the entry of high-risk capital into the property (real estate) sector (Immergluck, 2009). The foreclosures in the United States, the United Kingdom and many other places tragically illustrate the governing role of financial capital in the (re)production of suburban space.

In one of the few Foucauldian analyses of the subprime mortgage crisis, Paul Langley highlighted the different techniques of power utilized in the governance of subprime mortgages (Langley, 2009). He used the term ‘credit panopticon’ to describe how ‘credit scoring enabled the sorting, targeting, pricing and governing of customers through the prism of so-called “risk-based pricing”’ (p. 1408). In this respect, the broad political economic trends discussed above are linked to specific practices that affect everyday life, or what we call ‘suburbanism’. Yet these practices are not imposed as if they are an outside force, but rather resonate with the rise of the neoliberal entrepreneurial self. As Langley explained, the government of contemporary mass financial markets can thus be seen to feature the moral, political, and technological assembly of subjects who not only meet their outstanding obligations, but who also entrepreneurially manage and manipulate those obligations to maximise their freedom and security.

Langley highlighted how suburbanism, as a way of life, is increasingly defined by new forms of financial self-discipline. In methodological terms he also demonstrated the need to address the specific technologies of power that represent the capillaries of broader political economic trends.

Elvin Wyly and colleagues, in their examination of predatory lending, challenged the Foucauldian emphasis on the subject and looked at the clearly delineated class relations that have shaped the mortgage market in the United States (Wyly et al., 2006). Not accepting the notion that ‘bad loans’ are the result of poor choices made by consumers, they suggested that what matters is the collective interest of each class position – defined by systematic inequalities in access to land, finance capital and political power.

The authors argued that the multifaceted power of the capitalist class facilitated the extension of subprime mortgages with steep interest rates to marginalized social groups. Thus, the subprime mortgage tragedy is not the result of unscrupulous lenders, but rather represents a concerted effort to extract profits from vulnerable social groups. In this view the consolidation of a rentier class takes place, which through the force of law and access to financial institutions … facilitate the translation of use values into exchange values used for accumulation.

The key actors are local loan officers, large banks, attorneys, realtors, appraisers and the finance services that
collectively bring national policies to bear on smaller-scale personnel and local decisions, which, when taken together, have shaped the exploitation of marginalized communities. Predatory lending and the foreclosure crisis were most acute in inner suburban lending areas and selected inner suburbs, and outer suburbs and exurbs were hard hit because of rampant speculation, which made homeowners in these spaces vulnerable to falling prices (Hanlon et al., 2010). In addition, a high proportion of subprime mortgages have targeted marginalized spaces that have largely been ignored by mainstream lenders, specifically the inner suburbs and racialized communities (Wylly et al., 2006).

Authoritarian private governance

Swyngedouw (2005) argued that the emergent discourse and practice of governance has entailed a devolution of responsibility from the state to both private sector actors and parts of civil society. In contrast to the common perception that new forms of governance are more democratic and participatory comparatively to the state and contrary to normative expectations, emergent forms of governance are increasingly authoritarian. Non-governmental organizations, public–private partnerships, development corporations and various stakeholder–based associations are often autocratic and are producing questionable forms of political citizenship. Arguably authoritarian forms of governance are proliferating most quickly in suburban spaces.

The spatial form of urban-regions reflects broader social processes and relations (Harvey, 1982; Massey, 1994; Sennett, 1994; Zukin, 1991). The rise of gated communities, often on the urban periphery, is one example of a (sub)urban form that increasingly reflects the growing spatial and social inequalities tied to the rise and consolidation of neoliberalism. Defining gated communities, Atkinson and Blandy (2005) suggested that they have a spatial form comprised of gates and walls enclosing space otherwise expected to be publically accessible and also entail a legal framework that allows the extraction of monies to help pay for maintenance of common-buildings, common services, such as rubbish collection, and other revenue costs such as paying staff to clean or secure the neighbourhood.

Gating initially was an important urban form in South Africa and Latin America, but since the 1990s has risen in prominence throughout North America, Eastern and Western Europe, China, and South Asia. While gating is emerging as a global phenomenon, Setha Low points out that gated communities are ‘evolving from local architecture and socio-historical circumstances and [are] always embedded within specific cultural traditions’ (Low, 2004, p. 16; see also Chen and Webster, 2005). With respect to gating, Low highlighted the tension between universal trends and their particular manifestation in space and time that has been of focus throughout this paper. This paper raises the issue of gated communities as their proliferation has been strongly associated with the rise of privatized authoritarian forms of governance.

But these authoritarian forms are not only present and visible in the privatization of land and services. What is even more worrying are changing cultures of governance, which are being redefined through the recent forms of space production. The city is no longer acting as a society, or at the very least it plays less of a broad social role than in the past. The middle classes do not accept any longer sharing with and supporting popular classes the way they did when the welfare state was seen as the solution to solving and regulating social problems. The consequences are expressed in different ways: banishment of the poor, the relocation of the middle classes at the periphery, and the exclusion of the poor from traditional working-class neighbourhoods through gentrification (Donzelot, 2004).

Gating has a diverse history, examples of which can be found in most urban-regions. In former Soviet states gated residential houses and communities were a prominent feature of the urban periphery prior to the rise of state-socialism. Blinnikov et al. (2006) demonstrated a long history of gating in Moscow, starting with the nobility of the nineteenth century and then throughout the Soviet era as the elite attempted ‘to separate themselves from the controlled masses and veil they very fact of the existence of their “hidden ruling class”’ (p. 66). In the case of Belgrade, Hirt and Petrovic (2011) suggested that the existence of gated communities did not reflect the diffusion of Western ideals and practices, but rather that local and regional factors were pivotal. The colonial cities of South and South East Asia have been gated since the early periods of European colonialism with gated enclaves separating Europeans from indigenous populations (Leisch, 2002). In all of the different cases socio-spatial segregation was the modus operandi of gated communities. Physical barriers separated largely elite social groups from other classes and signified their prestige and wealth as embodied in the architecture and planning of suburban landscapes.

Since the 1980s the spatial reach of gated communities has become increasingly global and at the same time the number of enclosed communities had grown rapidly (Atkinson and Blandy, 2005; Davis, 1992; Low, 2008). Atkinson and Blandy (2005) suggested that the rise of gated ‘fortress cities’ is reinforcing a trend of polarization as the resources of wealthy classes are being withdrawn from the public purse and redirected as exclusively private developments. In their eyes, the social contract associated with the Keynesian welfare state is being attacked through new spatial forms of development. Low (2008) explained that the transition from public government to private homeowners
associations, achieved through incorporation, has further polarized wealth and state capacity. In what is a dubious practice, the incorporation of gated communities, which includes tracts of land and people outside of the community, allows the government to draw on a larger tax base. However, the political power tends to reside within the gated community and public funds can be utilized for services for upkeep behind the gates while at the same time excluding the general public. In the case of Moscow, Blinnikov et al. (2006) argued that the growing wealth of a new elite class and the absence of central planning has given rise to the growth of privatized developments set against the backdrop of the planned and crowded historic city. At the same time, the rise of gated communities and neoliberalism had been closely tied to the rise of finance capital. Finances for development can increasingly be obtained internationally and in the case of Accra in Ghana the liberalization of finance has facilitated the growth of gated communities that are largely financed and owned by international actors (Grant, 2005).

The growth of gated communities and neoliberalism has been tied to a revolution in the governance of suburban spaces. Lang and LeFurgy (2007a, 2007b) argued that the uneven development of suburbs and the rise of gated and master-planned communities has led to a privatized and fractured form of governance. In many spaces, but not all, municipal, urban, provincial and federal governments were key actors in how the suburbanization process proceeded and was experienced, albeit in close connection to the interests of capital. The rise of homeowners’ associations and private managerial firms have steadily displaced the local state in the governance of suburban space. Witnessed at a global scale are increased forms of private authoritarian governance. In the case of Taiwan, Chen and Webster (2005) explained how governance is increasingly a market in and of itself (or a terrain of capital accumulation). Private property management companies have exploded and emerged into a multi-product industry providing an increasing range of governance functions ranging from security, rubbish collection, repairing common facilities, the provision of financial services to residents, and the list goes on.

Homeowners’ associations and private management firms both aim to regulate social space and as a result there has been a rapid erasure of public space and the emergence of privately owned and controlled landscapes, many of which are suburban. As Low (2008) noted, gated communities restrict access not just to residents’ homes, but also to the use of public spaces and services – roads, parks, facilities, and open space – all contained within an enclosure.

(p. 90)

Mike Davis illustrated how the growing disparities of the post-Fordist era have been materialized in suburban forms:

The security-driven logic of contemporary urban design finds it major ‘grassroots’ expression in the frenetic efforts of Los Angele’s affluent neighbourhoods to physically insulate their real-estate values and life-styles. Luxury developments outside the city limits have often been able to incorporate as ‘fortress cities,’ complete with security walls, guarded entries, private police, and even private roadway.

(Davis, 1992, p. 172)

Low (2004, 2008) saw this type of gated landscape as a form of spatial governance. The building of walls and gates regulates behaviour and the movement of people through (sub)urban landscapes. The architecture itself functions to exclude and segregate different social groups. Yet there are different mechanisms and processes that facilitate this process such as the use of private security guards as an intimidation tactic, the buying up of private property circling a public space or amenity, incorporation and restrictive covenants.

The growth of gated communities has been positively undemocratic and not just because of the erosion of public space. Developers, rather than elected governments, establish homeowners’ associations and until properties are sold the developer tends to hold the balance of power on the association and thus can initially decide on the board of governors and a host of covenants and restrictions that regulate the development. Voting in many homeowners’ associations depends on an individual’s share of ownership. As one’s share increases so does one’s voting power. In the United States, non-share-holding residents (for example, renters) are excluded from participating in the governance of gated communities.

The rise of gating can be associated with distinctly new styles of suburbanism typified by fear, prestige, segregation and the loss of social integration coupled with illusory attachment to community. These facets of everyday life in gated communities are mainstays of suburban culture more generally but have been amplified with the rise of gating. Gated communities

recover the notions of Michel Foucault (1977, 1980) that power is spatially exercised and [applies this insight] to the new urban conditions of the post-industrial city.

(Salcedo and Torres, 2004, p. 27)

One of the major justifications for gating is fear of crime and social groups that are represented as different and dangerous comparatively with those living behind the gates. Fear of urban social uprisings, and social and physical contagion have been powerful incentives behind segregation. These discourses are often racialized as is the case in Jakarta in Indonesia in which Chinese residents have been subject to attacks from the indigenous populations, which has resulted in the development of gated and fenced-in compounds (Leisch, 2002). Often security concerns are overblown and justified by a culture of fear. This fear is often premised on
CONCLUSION

The argument has been made in this paper that suburban governance can be viewed through the distinct but complementary modalities of the state, capital accumulation and private authoritarianism. To summarize the discussion of the state, it is possible to identify different state forms that have played a role in suburbanization processes. At the same time, it is important not to view the state as monolithic but rather it is crucial to see the scaled nature of states and to consider it as a site of social conflict crystallized, however momentarily, in an institutional form. Emphasizing the role of capital in the making of suburban life allows it to be acknowledged how a range of practices, including industrial relocation and financialization, have defined the suburbanization process and suburbanism itself. The power of capital has been closely bound to that of the state, but it is impossible to understand the state without considering capital, and vice versa. If relations between state and capital are at the heart of suburbanization and the forms it took in different contexts, the recent financial and political crisis highlights how local economic development is currently challenged by two major problems: firstly, the pressures coming from external flows as the result of economic globalization; and secondly, the weakening of the state as responsible for social and economic redistribution (Mongin, 2008). Tendencies towards privatized authoritarian forms of governance have been very strongly linked with recent suburban development. Gated communities have been discussed here as the core of a range of governmentalities in which socio-spatial differentiation has morphed into a more coercive landscape of exclusion and segregation.

These three modalities are being proposed here as a conceptual framework for a discussion on governance of suburbanization and increasingly diverse ways of suburban life. It is suggested that tensions between these modalities will rise as they often have incompatible processes, goals and outcomes. Most importantly, the dynamics of the various suburbanism ways of life that unfold in the emergent peripheries of our cities rebel against the governmentality (Foucault, 2003) of the suburbanization process that produced and conditioned them. In this sense, we are taking up a way of thinking that has been propagated by Warren Magnusson in his important new book The Politics of Urbanism (2012) in which he urges us to see more ‘like a city’, that is, to embrace the complex, non-sovereign ways in which the governmentalities of the urban unfold and eschew the contained view of governance that is common to our usual spatio-political ontology. In taking up this thought, it can be concluded that perhaps ‘seeing like a suburb’ will be a very important part of this shift in perspective on the modalities of governance in the peripheral city.

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NOTES

1. One example of this is an article written by Sonia Hirt (Hirt, 2007) that sets out to explore whether peri-urban development on the outskirts of Sofia, Bulgaria, is actually a process of suburbanization. Her research asks whether Sofia’s development pattern exhibits the same characteristics of suburbanization in the United States discussed by Kenneth Jackson in his influential book Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (1985). There is much to commend in Hirt’s article, and in particular the detailed ethnography of the everyday in the suburbs of Sofia; yet it is emblematic of a trend that enshrines the US experience as hegemonic and measures other forms of peripheral development against the norm of the United States.

2. For a critical discussion of this model, see Kooy and Bakker (2008), Coutard (2002), and McFarlane and Rutherford (2008).
3. Phelps et al. (2010) appear rather reluctant to provide a quick definition of post-suburbia preferring to develop three analytical windows for identifying post-suburbia. First, they highlight the ‘temporal disparity’ that defines post-suburbia, by which they refer to ‘differences in the pace and timing at which … postsuburban settlements have emerged in different settings (p. 369). This point resonates with the present authors’ own comments on the limitations of providing a periodization of suburbanism. Second, they suggest the spaces of post-suburbia are more fragmented, splintered (Graham and Marvin, 2001) and decentred, and thus at odds with the concentric circles that define previous phases of urban and suburban growth. Third is the new differentiation of actors involved in the production, ideology and politics of post-suburbia, with an emphasis on the changing role of the state, the increasingly cosmopolitan character of post-suburbia and the lingering ideologies associated with ‘traditional’ suburbia.

4. While proper treatment to the subject cannot be given in this paper due to space limitations, it should be stated at the outset that the concept, ‘state’, is being used in a broad sense. It encompasses theoretical meanings (as in ‘state theory’), refers to the nation-state as the classical container of political action, but goes beyond this definition to refer to sub-national states, local states in particular. The authors acknowledge fully recent work on the rescaling of states and political economies in this context (Brenner et al., 2003; Keil and Mahon, 2009; Magnusson, 1995, 2012).

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